Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

1989

The Admissibility of Evidence Protected by Noerr-Pennington
Michael Lewyn
Touro Law Center, mlewyn@tourolaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
3 Antitrust 28 (1989)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 3 Antitrust 28 1988-1989
Content downloaded/printed from
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Mon Aug 15 16:12:41 2011
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0162-7996

A

R

T

IC

LES•A

N

D

•FEA

T

U

R

E

S

The Admissibility of Evidence Protected
by Noerr-Pennington
by Michael E. Lewyn
Although political activity is protected
from antitrust liability under the NoerrPennington doctrine, evidence of such
activity is at times admissible to prove
other antitrust violations. Such evidence,
if admissible, could be used to prove
anticompetitive intent, or as a "plus factor" to prove conspiracy where the only
other evidence of conspiracy is parallel
conduct. However, the standard of admissibility adopted by most courts yields
an interesting result: where Noerr-Pennington evidence is most necessary to
prove a violation, it is least likely to be
admitted, and where such evidence is
admitted, it usually is superfluous.
Pennington itself estpblished that
"Noerr-Pennington evidence" is admissible under some circumstances. There,
the court stated in dicta that the trial judge
may admit evidence of protected activity
"if he deemed it probative and not unduly
prejudicial." United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 n.3
(1965). The Court invoked the common
law rule that evidence that is "barred
from forming the basis for a suit, may
nevertheless be introduced if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under
scrutiny." Id.
This passage from Penningtonhas been
interpreted to mean that Noerr-Pennington evidence shall be evaluated under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which
requires exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. United States
Football League v.National Football
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League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1171
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affid, 842 F.2d 1335,
1373-75 (2d Cir. 1988).' In practice, the
application of the balancing test excludes
Noerr-Penninglon evidence in almost any
case where it is needed to establish a
violation. Although this appears peculiar, it may be consistent with the view
that because Noerr-Pennington evidence

is insufficient to support a finding of conspiracy, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Id. at 461.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's exclusion, holding that although an inference of conspiracy could
be drawn from the evidence, "it more
d!rectly suggests an agreement to influence legislators." Id. at 466. The court

"... where Noerr-Penningtonevidence is most necessary
to prove a violation, it is least likely to be admitted, and
where such evidence is admitted, it usually is
superfluous."
"by its very nature chills the exercise of
First Amendment rights . . . lit] is properly viewed as presumptively prejudicial." United States Football League, 634
F. Supp. at 1181.2
Absence of Other Probative Evidence
Whether Noerr-Pennington evidence is
admissible depends in part on whether
other evidence of antitrust violations exists. Where the only probative evidence
of a violation relates to protected activity, such evidence generally will be inadmissible. For instance, where the only
probative evidence of conspiracy (other
than parallel conduct) is Noerr-Pennington evidence, such evidence is inadmissible. Weit v. Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
In Weit, plaintiffs argued that the trial
court erroneously excluded evidence of
defendant's lobbying activities. The court
had found that plaintiffs' evidence of
conspiracy iother than defendants' parallel pricing) was "so insubstantial . . .
as to preclude a verdict for plaintiffs."
Id. at 466. As conscious parallelism alone

held that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial
quality:
Given the lack of any substantial
evidence of an antitrust conspiracy
in the instant case, the threat of prejudice from admission of this evidence is considerable. The lack of
other probative evidence of conspiracy would serve to focus the jury's attention on the lobbying
evidence. This could easily result in
a finding of antitrust liability for engaging in the First Amendment right
to petition which Noerr-Pennington
protects.
Id. at 467. Weit stands for the proposition
that where conscious parallelism is alleged and ne "plus factors" exist other
than protected activity, such evidence
should be excluded as more prejudicial
than probative.
Similarly, in Bright v. Moss Anbulance Services, Inc., 824 F.2d 819 (10th
Cir. 1987), plaintiff, an ambulance service, alleged that a competitor had attempted to monopolize the county
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ambulance market. Plaintiff's most credible evidence of market power was a study
showing that defendant had an eightyfive percent market share in the county.
However, since most of defendant's
business arose from a franchise that was
granted by a city, activity related to the
franchise was protected by Noerr-Pennington. Thus, the court held, dcfendants' "enjoyment of the market share

"Where the only probative evidence of a violation relates
to protected activity, such evidence generally will be
inadmissible."
devolved from the protected activity cannot support allegations of market power."
id. at 824. As plaintiff had presented no
other probative evidence of market
power, the court affirmed summary judgment fof defendant.
Although it did not directly address
admissibility, Bright also stands for the
proposition that evidence of protected
activity generally is either useless or inadmissible where no other probative evidence exists.
Based on an analyis of the Weit and
Bright cases, it would appear that where
Noerr-Penningtonevidence is most necessary to prove an antitrust violation, its
probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial impact.
Where Other Evidence Exists:
Discretion to Admit
Where plaintiff has submitted significant
evidence of antitrust violations other than
activity protected by Noerr-Pennington,
the case law is split as to whether such
evidence should be admitted.
Numerous cases have admitted evidence of protected activity under the
Pennington "purpose and character" rule.'
And, in contrast, other cases have held
evidence of protected activity inadmissible on the basis that such evidence was
"cumulative" or "corroborative." 4
There is no clear pattern within individual circuits. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits both have admitted NoerrPennington evidence under the "purpose
and character" rule and, on other occa-
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sions, have excluded such evidence as
cumulative. No case addressing admissibility has attempted to distinguish or
discredit cases on the other side of the
issue. Furthermore, a look at some typical cases offers little guidance to practitioners.
For instance, in Household Goods
CarriersBureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152
(5th Cir. 1971), a manufacturer of highway mileage guides alleged that a competitor and a movers' trade association
conspired to monopolize the market.
After defendant introduced a government memorandum accusing the plaintiff
of misrepresentation, plaintiff responded
with evidence of lobbying by the defendant. Although plaintiff already had introduced an allegedly libelous letter by
one of the defendants, the court admitted
evidence of defendants' lobbying to show
"the 'purpose and character of the transactions under scrutiny,' to rebut the insinuations put into evidence by the
defendants, and to prove the existence
of a conspiracy ... " 452 F.2d at 15758. Although a libelous letter suggests
the existence of "insinuations" as surely
as does evidence of lobbying, the court
did not consider the possibility that the
latter evidence might be cumulative.
Iln contrast, in U.S. Football League,
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of
defendant's lobbying between 1961 and
1966 with respect to sports-related legislation, in order to prove that such lobbying was "part of a long-standing
conspiracy to monopolize the market in
professional football." 634 F. Supp. at
1171. The court held that, "As evidence
of the NFL's state of mind in the 1980's,
it levidence of lobbying] is weak, since
the lobbying occurred from fifteen to
twenty years before the events at issue
in this case took place" and "to whatever
extent such conduct evidences monopolistic intent, it is cumulative to other
evidence that plaintiffs have cited to
Court." Id. Accordingly, the court excluded the lobbying evidence under Rule
403 because its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice to defendant's First Amendment interests. The
Second Circuit wholly endorsed the district court's reasoning on this issue. U.S.
Football League, 842 F.2d at 1374.
Cases excluding evidence of protected
activity as "cumulative" have done so
SPRING 1989

29

A

R

T

I

C

L

under Rule 403. They have not explicitly
defined the term, however, nor have they
furnished practitioners with any guidance beyond that provided by Rule 403
itself. Moreover, they stand in stark contrast to those cases (such as Household
Carriers and Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers
Association, 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir.
1977)) admitting evidence of protected
activity without any consideration of
"cumulativeness."
It appears, therefore, that a principled
distinction between cases admitting evidence o' protected activity and those excluding such evidence as cumulative
cannot be found. There are, however,
several hypotheses that might explain the
differences between the two groups of
cases. For instance, evidence of protected activity arguably may be excluded
as cumulative only where plaintiff prevails, or such evidence may be admitted
only to clarify an ambiguous record, or
where evidence of protected activity is
of a different type than other evidence
in the record.
Unfortunately for those in search of
an analytical framework, none of the hypotheses stands up to analysis based on
an examination of two roughly contemporaneous circuit court decisions, Alexander v. National Farmers Organization,
687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 937 (1983); and City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating,
734 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1984).
Alexander admitted evidence of protected activity, while City of Cleveland
excluded such evidence, yet the cases
seem indistinguishable factually. In City
of Cleveland, a city that had owned a
defunct utility brought suit against a private utility for monopolization and attempted monopolization. At trial,
defendant admitted that it intended to
eliminate competition. Furthermore,
defendant's conduct (which included soliciting participation by plaintiff in a
price-fixing conspiracy, a "displacement
program" aimed at displacing the city
utility, and delaying or refusing interconnection whenever possible) was circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive
intent. City of Cleveland, 734 F.2d at
1164.
Plaintiff attempted to introduce a joint
stipulation that defendant had induced a
30
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third party to file suit to prevent a government-owned interconnection between
the utilities. The court affirmed exclusion of this evidence, holding that as
other evidence of anticompetitive intent
existed, evidence of defendant's activity
"was simply cumulative in its effect."
Id.
Despite the court's finding that ample
evidence of anticompetitive intent existed, the court affirmed a jury verdict
for defendant. Thus, City of Cleveland
supports the proposition that evidence
may be excluded as "cumulative" even
where defendant prevails.
In Alexander, evidence of protected
activity was admitted despite the fact that
ample evidence of anticompetitive intent
and conduct existed. In Alexander,
plaintiff, a milk cooperative, filed suit
against competitors for, inter alia, con-
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offs were "the strongest evidence of an
unlawful purpose." Id. at 1197. Such conduct was "predatory on its face" and an
examination of the underlying evidence
"only confirms that an inference of unlawful purpose must be drawn." Id. at
1199. Other condemned conduct included threats of litigation against customers of plaintiff, refusals by defendant
to acknowledge customer terminations,
destruction of evidence by a defendant,
and admissions of predatory motive by
defendants' officials.
Another hypothess which might explain the divergence between cases admitting Noerr-Pennington evidence and
those refusing to do so is that the evidence may be admitted only to clarify
an otherwise ambiguous record-that is,
to reveal the unlawful character of seemingly innocent conduct. The facts of City

courts use terms such as "cumulative" and

"corroborative," they are merely balancing probativeness
and prejudice."
spiracy to monopolize. Plaintiff submitted evidence that defendant, through
letters and other contacts with government officials, had attempted to prevent
plaintiff from participating in federal
marketing orders. Alexander, 687 F.2d
at 1195. The court admitted the evidence
because it proved that defendants "acted
in concert with the specific intent of
blockirg competition." Id.
The plaintiff's other evidence was more
than adequate, however. For instance,
defendants tried to pressure plaintiff's
customers into buying all their milk from
defendants. Such conduct was termed an
"unequivocal illustration of predatory
conduct aimed at coercing buyers" to buy
from defendants and "blatantly predatory." Id. at 1196. The court concluded
that the "purpose and intent" of such conduct was to get customers to buy only
from defendants, and that such conduct
"tends to show an unlawful intent" behind similar conduct directed at plaintiff.
As to another buyer, similar conduct was
termed "plainly predatory." Id. at 1198.
The court held that defendant's price discrimination and threatened supply cut-

of Cleveland and Alexander do not support this explanation, however. In Alexander, the evidence of predatory intent
and conduct was hardly unambiguous.
Nevertheless, the court admitted evidence of protected activity. By contrast,
defendant won a jury verdict in City of
Cleveland.
Alternatively, it might be hypothesized that the evidence of protected activity is excluded where such evidence
is of the same type as other evidence and
admitted where it is of a different type.
For instance, if other evidence is direct,
Noerr-Pennington evidence would be
admitted if circumstantial and excluded
if direct. Again, the facts of City of
Cleveland and Alexander lend no support
to this hypothesis.
In both cases, evidence of anticompetitive intent (other than Noerr-Pennington evidence) included direct as well
as circumstantial evidence. In City of
Cleveland, the existence of anticompetitive intent was admitted at trial, and
such intent could also be inferred from
defendant's acts. City of Cleveland, 734
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F.2d at 1164. Similarly, in Alexander,
predatory motive was admitted in documents, 687 F.2d at 1207, and could also
be inferred from defendants' acts. Under
the hypothesis, both courts should have
ruled similarly on admissibility. In fact,
the court in Cit' of Cleveland excluded
Noerr-Pennington evidence while in
Alexander it was admitted.

"Therefore, practitioners are well advised to take nothing
for granted in evaluating the admissibility of NoerrPennington evidence."
Testing the hypotheses against the
Alexanler and City of Clevelanml decisions shows that there is no logical basis
for distinguishing cases excluding NoerrPennington evidence as "cumulative"
from those admitting such evidence. The
only way to reconcile the two groups of
cases is to recognize that when courts
use terms such as "cumulative" and "corroborative," they are merely balancing
probativeness and prejudice.' Therefore,
the split in authority may be more apparent than real.
Thus, if other significant evidence of
antitrust violations is found, the admis-
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sibility of' Noerr-Pennington evidence
involves no fixed legal criteria other than
a weighing of probative value and prejudicial impact. Therefore, practitioners
are well advised to take nothing 'or
granted in evaluating the admissibility of
Noerr-Pennington evidence.
Conclusion
The admissibility of Noerr-Pennington
evidence will depend on the availability
of' other evidence of antitrust violations.
Where no evidence of antitrust violations
is available, or where the only evidence
is legally insufficient to prove a violation, Noerr-Pennington evidence has
been excluded. In contrast, where a great
deal of evidence of illegality exists, courts
often admit Noerr-Pennington evidence
despite the fact that it may not be needed
to prove a violation. Although admission
is disfavored, no specific rule binds
judges, who, it appears, may admit or
exclude Noerr-Pennington evidence
without any analytical framework to
guide their decisions.
Thus, plaintiffs seeking to admit
Noerr-Pennington evidence face a
"Catch-22": where evidence is truly necessary to the development of a case it
will not be admitted, and where it is admissible it usually will be superfluous. 0

I See also Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 668 F Supp. 408, 411 (D.N.J. 1987) (balancing test adopted where plaintiff in products liability case sought to introduce
Noerr-Pennington evidence) (dictum).
2 See also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 203.7 at 52 (Supp. 1987)(weighing of Noerr-Pennington evidence "should lend to its exclusion, at
least presumptively"); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts To Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits ofthe Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine. 45 U. CiiI.
L. REv. 80, 121(1977) ("courts have been properly reluctant to admit evidence of conduct lawful under Noerr"). However, in Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
668 F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1987), the court held that the presumption was inapplicable where "the lobbying activity, though protected, is ethically questionable."
Id. at 411.
3 See, e.g., MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (admissibility briefly noted); Alexander v. National
Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983) (in addition to engaging in protected activity, defendant liable for numerous independent
violations); Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n, 568 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1977) (lobbying evidence held to have "evidentiary value" although liability found
based on group boycott unrelated to lobbying); Household Goods Carriers' Bur. v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971) (evidence of lobbying admitted to prove
anticompetitive intent, although allegedly libelous letter also admitted).
4 See United States Football League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1171 (S.D.N.Y 1986), aft'd, 842 F.2d 1335, 1374-75 (2d Cir. 1988); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 734 F.2d 1157, 1164 (6th Cir.), aff g 538 F Supp. 1344 (N.D. Ohio 1981), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984) (as other
probative evidence available, evidence of lawsuit by defendants "simply corroborative"); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (evidence of medical society resolution supporting defendants' litigation excluded as cumulative regarding drafter's
intent, where drafter was already defendant at time of resolution).
5 Areeda suggests that evidence of protected activity also may be introduced to prove an anticompetitive "overall scheme." R AREEDA & H. HOV.NKAMI', supra note
I, at 203.7. However, other authorities do not view the "overall scheme" theory as a separate basis for admissibility. In Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 668
F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1987), plaintiff sought to introduce Noerr-Pennington evidence as part of "a continuing course of deceptive conduct." Id. at 411. The court
held that "[wihether such evidence is admissible requires a balancing of its probative value against undue or unfair prejudice." Id.Thus, according to Cippolone,
the "overall scheme" theory is merely a means of ascertaining the probative value of evidence under Rule 403.
Other authorities hold that the "overall scheme" theory relates to the protected status of political activity rather than its admissibility. See, e.g., ABA A'NTITRUsT
SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 615 (2d ed. 1984); Scott v. City of Siotta City., Iowa, 1982-83 Trade Cas. tCCH) 1 65,203 at p. 71,847 (N.D. Iowa
1982) ("Where legitimate lobbying is combined with illegal actions, the Noerr-Pennington exemption has no application"). As such an "overall scheme" exists only
where other evidence of antitrust violations exists, the difference between this theory and a Rule 403 analysis is of no practical importance.
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